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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this appeal we must decide whether assessing a 
railroad for a portion of the construction and maintenance 
costs of a bridge intersecting its right-of-way constitutes a 
discriminatory tax under the Railroad Revitalization and 
Regulatory Reform (4-R) Act of 1976, 49 U.S.C. S 11501.1 
The district court held that the assessment was a 
discriminatory tax. We will reverse. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The original complaint alleges a violation of 49 U.S.C. S 11503. That 
section was recodified pursuant to Pub. L. No. 104-88, S 102(a) (1996). 
We will refer to provisions of the 4-R Act at issue here by section number 
as currently codified in title 49, U.S. Code. 
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I. Background 
 
The Wheeling & Lake Erie Railway Company subleases a 
railroad right-of-way passing under "Old Washington Pike" 
in Scott Township, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. The 
bridge supporting that highway became so deteriorated that 
it was closed in 1982. The Township procured the 
necessary approvals from the Pennsylvania Public Utility 
Commission and constructed a new bridge at the 
Township's initial expense. The Commission then ordered 
Wheeling to pay 3% of the total construction costs of the 
bridge replacement project and 15% of the maintenance 
costs of the new bridge (excluding costs of snow and ice 
removal).2 The Commission also assessed another railroad, 
whose tracks pass under the same span, 3% and 15% 
respectively. That railroad is not a party. The Pennsylvania 
Department of Transportation was to pay 7% of the 
construction costs. The Township was to pay the remaining 
87% of the construction costs and 70% of the maintenance 
costs, with an 80% reimbursement for construction costs 
coming from Pennsylvania's Billion Dollar Bridge Project 
Fund. 
 
Wheeling filed this action requesting declaratory and 
injunctive relief from the construction and maintenance 
costs. It argued that the assessment was a discriminatory 
tax in violation of the 4-R Act. All parties filed motions for 
summary judgment. In its order granting Wheeling's 
motion, the district court declared that the assessment was 
an unlawfully discriminatory tax under the 4-R Act. The 
court also enjoined the defendants from assessing or 
collecting the construction and maintenance costs from 
Wheeling. The Commission and the Township appealed 
separately. We consolidated the appeals. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Commission delegated this case to a Public Utility Commission 
Administrative Law Judge who issued a Recommended Decision. (J.A. at 
226.) That decision included a proposed allocation of the construction 
and maintenance costs and also decided that Wheeling was not 
discriminated against on the basis of its railroad status. (J.A. at 245-
50.) 
The Commission adopted the Recommended Decision in its September 
23, 1994 Order. (J.A. at 266.) 
 
                                4 
  
II. Eleventh Amendment Immunity 
 
The Commission did not raise its Eleventh Amendment 3 
argument before the district court. Nonetheless, Eleventh 
Amendment immunity can properly be raised for thefirst 
time on appeal. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 658, 
94 S. Ct. 1347, 1363 (1974) ("the Eleventh Amendment 
sufficiently partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar so 
that it need not be raised in the trial court"); Bolden v. 
Southeastern Pa. Trans. Auth., 953 F.2d 807, 812 (3d Cir. 
1991). 
 
The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against 
unconsenting states in federal courts. See Seminole Tribe of 
Fla. v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1122 (1996). 
There are two exceptions: Congress may abrogate a state's 
immunity, id., and parties may sue state officers for 
prospective injunctive and declaratory relief. See Idaho v. 
Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 
2034 (1997); Seminole, ___ U.S. at ___, 116 S. Ct. at 1132; 
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S. Ct. 441 (1908); 
Balgowan v. New Jersey, 115 F.3d 214, 217 (3d Cir. 1997). 
Here, the parties do not dispute that the Pennsylvania 
Public Utility Commission is an arm of the Commonwealth 
of Pennsylvania protected by Eleventh Amendment 
principles of sovereign immunity.4 Also, Pennsylvania has 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. "The Judicial Power of the United States shall not be construed to 
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against 
one of the Unites States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 
Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. Const. amend. XI. "[T]he Eleventh 
Amendment [stands] for the constitutional principle that state sovereign 
immunity limited the federal courts' jurisdiction under Article III." 
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1127 
(1996). "[A] State can waive its Eleventh Amendment protection and 
allow a federal court to hear and decide a case commence or prosecuted 
against it. The Amendment, in other words, enacts a sovereign immunity 
from suit, rather than a nonwaivable limit on the federal judiciary's 
subject-matter jurisdiction." Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, ___ 
U.S. ___, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 2033 (1997). 
 
4. In its reply brief, the Commission analyzed whether it is an arm of the 
state under the criteria this Court set forth in Christy v. Pennsylvania 
Turnpike Commission, 54 F.3d 1140, 1144 (3d Cir. 1995). The 
Commission concluded that they are indeed an arm of the state, and 
Wheeling does not take issue with that determination. 
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not given its consent to be sued in federal court. 5 The 
question remaining is whether any exceptions to immunity 
apply. 
 
A. Congressional Abrogation of Immunity 
 
A valid abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity 
requires Congress to "unequivocally express[ ] its intent to 
abrogate the immunity" and to act "pursuant to a valid 
exercise of power." Seminole, ___ U.S. at ___, 116 S. Ct. at 
1123 (quoting Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68, 106 S. 
Ct. 423, 426 (1985)). Here, the parties agree that section 
11501(c)6 is an unmistakably clear expression of Congress's 
intent to abrogate states' immunity regarding violations of 
section 11501(b). However, the parties disagree on whether 
the statute is a valid exercise of congressional power. 
 
The dispute centers largely around Seminole, which 
overruled Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 23, 
109 S. Ct. 2273, 2286 (1989) (holding that Congress could 
validly abrogate a state's sovereign immunity pursuant to 
its Commerce Clause powers). In Seminole, the Court noted 
that it had previously recognized only one other source of 
congressional power to abrogate states' sovereign immunity 
--the Fourteenth Amendment. Seminole, ___ U.S. at ___, 
116 S. Ct. at 1125 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 
445, 96 S. Ct. 2666 (1976)). Thus, after Seminole, the only 
remaining source of congressional power to abrogate states' 
Eleventh Amendment immunity is the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has codified its position on 
immunity as follows: "Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be 
construed to waive the immunity of the Commonwealth from suit in 
Federal courts guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States." 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 8521. 
 
6. Subsection (c) states in pertinent part as follows: 
 
       "Notwithstanding section 1341 of title 28 and without regard to the 
       amount in controversy or citizenship of the parties, a district 
court 
       of the United States has jurisdiction, concurrent with other 
       jurisdiction of courts of the United States and the States, to 
prevent 
       a violation of subsection (b) of this section." 
 
49 U.S.C. S 11501(c). 
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Congress promulgated the 4-R Act pursuant to its 
Commerce Clause powers because of the interstate nature 
of the railroad industry. Section 11501 announces 
Congress's concern that discriminatory taxation 
"unreasonably burden[s] and discriminate[s] against 
interstate commerce." 49 U.S.C. S 11501(b); see also 49 
U.S.C. S 10101 (listing the purposes and policies of railroad 
regulation). However, when determining the sources of 
Congress's authority to legislate, we may look beyond the 
expressed constitutional basis in a statute's preamble or 
legislative history. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 
478, 100 S. Ct. 2758, 2774-75 (1980). The Supreme Court 
directs us to: 
 
       "proceed to the consideration whether [S 11501] is 
       "appropriate legislation" to enforce the Equal Protection 
       Clause, that is . . . whether [S 11501] may be regarded 
       as an enactment to enforce the Equal Protection 
       Clause, whether it is "plainly adapted to that end" and 
       whether it is not prohibited by but is consistent with 
       "the letter and spirit of the constitution." " 
 
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651, 86 S. Ct. 1717, 
1724 (1966). In a later examination of Morgan, the Court 
established that to answer this inquiry: 
 
       "[i]t was enough that the Court could perceive a basis 
       upon which Congress could reasonably predicate a 
       judgment that application of literacy qualifications 
       within the compass of S 4(e) would discriminate in 
       terms of access to the ballot and consequently in terms 
       of access to the provision of administration of 
       government programs." 
 
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 477, 100 S. Ct. at 2774 (citing 
Morgan, 384 U.S. at 652-53, 86 S. Ct. at 1722). 7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Since Seminole, the District of Wyoming is the only other court to 
address this issue, specifically regarding the 4-R Act. See Union Pac. 
R.R. 
Co. v. Burton, 949 F. Supp. 1546 (D. Wyo. 1996). We disagree with that 
court's analysis because it was restricted to the expressed purposes of 
the 4-R Act set forth in section 10101. See id. at 1554. We look beyond 
the general purposes of the 4-R Act as a whole, to what we perceive as 
the purpose underlying section 11501, the portion of the act implicated 
here. 
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The legislative history of the statute before us shows 
"Congress was aware that the railroads" `are easy prey for 
State and local tax assessors" in that they are "nonvoting, 
often nonresident, targets for local taxation," who cannot 
easily remove themselves from the locality.' " Department of 
Rev. of Or. v. ACF Indus., 510 U.S. 332, 336, 114 S. Ct. 
843, 847 (1994) (quoting Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Board of 
Equalization, 480 U.S. 123, 131, 107 S. Ct. 1038, 1043 
(1987) (quoting S. Rep. No. 91-630, at 3 (1969))). Moreover, 
another court of appeals has held that the very purpose of 
section 11501 was to remedy discrimination against 
railroads: 
 
       "Until this law was passed, as pointed out by the 
       appellants, states could constitutionally classify 
       railroads differently from all other taxpayers for the 
       imposition of state taxes without violating the equal 
       protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It was 
       the obvious purpose of Congress to put an end to this 
       practice, where such treatment of the railroads as a 
       class was discriminatory in effect." 
 
Alabama Great S. R.R. Co. v. Eagerton, 663 F.2d 1036, 
1040 (11th Cir. 1981) (emphasis added). The Supreme 
Court has also said that "[c]orrectly viewed, S 5 [of the 
Fourteenth Amendment] is a positive grant of legislative 
power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in 
determining whether and what legislation is needed to 
secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment." 
Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651, 86 S. Ct. at 1723-24. 
 
It is evident to us that Congress recognized the potential 
for state and local taxing authorities to discriminate against 
railroads in violation of their Equal Protection rights under 
the Fourteenth Amendment. We conclude that Congress 
had the power, pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, to promulgate section 11501, and did so to 
protect the railroads. Therefore, Congress validly abrogated 
Eleventh Amendment immunity, and the district court 
properly exercised jurisdiction over this lawsuit. 
 
Neither our analysis nor our conclusion is affected by the 
recent decisions cited by the Commission. It cites Wilson- 
Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203 (6th Cir. 1996), as 
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employing the correct post-Seminole analysis for 
determining whether an act of Congress, generally regarded 
to be within its Commerce Clause powers, can also be 
justified by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Commission 
reads Wilson-Jones to hold that, barring an explicit 
congressional recitation of authority under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, only statutes that remedy discrimination 
against a class of persons that Fourteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence has already identified as deserving special 
protection can be regarded as enactments to enforce the 
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
We disagree with this narrow reading of Wilson-Jones. 
There, the Court found no evidence that the core provisions 
of the Fair Labor Standards Act, before being amended by 
the Equal Pay Act, were enacted pursuant to Section Five 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although the Court feared 
the implications of an expansive rule "that an act is valid 
[merely] if it is rationally related to achieving equal 
protection of the laws," it expressly admitted that its 
"opinion might be different if Congress madefindings that 
a particular group needed legal protection to remedy some 
sort of invidious discrimination not directly addressed by 
federal precedent." Wilson-Jones, 99 F.3d at 209, 210 n.4. 
Here, however, the remedial nature of section 11501's 
constitutional protection is evident, despite the lack of an 
explicit congressional statement. We believe that Congress 
was within its discretion when it found that railroads need 
special protection from local tax assessors. Therefore, we 
reach a different conclusion than the Court in Wilson-Jones.8 
 
Nor is our result affected by City of Boerne v. Flores, ___ 
U.S. ___, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997), in which the Supreme 
Court declared the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
unconstitutional. The Court found that the Act was "so out 
of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object 
that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed 
to prevent, unconstitutional behavior. It appears, instead, 
to attempt a substantive change in constitutional 
protections." Id. at ___, 117 S. Ct. at 2170. In so holding, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The reasoning in Wilson-Jones was also rejected in another Fair Labor 
Standards Act case. See Mills v. Maine, 118 F.3d 37, 45 (1st Cir. 1997). 
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the Court reasoned that "[i]f Congress could define its own 
powers by altering the Fourteenth Amendment's meaning," 
it would be "difficult to conceive of a principle that would 
limit congressional power." Id. at ___, 117 S. Ct. at 2168. 
Here, section 11501 is not out of proportion to its objective, 
nor does it substantively change any constitutional 
protections. 
 
We recently decided College Savings Bank v. Florida 
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, Nos. 97- 
5055, 97-5086, 1997 WL 749514 (3d Cir. Dec. 5, 1997), in 
which we held that the right to be free of false advertising 
is not a constitutionally protected intangible property right. 
Therefore, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was not implicated, and we concluded that the 
Trademark Remedy Clarification Act of 1992 did not 
abrogate Florida's immunity because it did not further the 
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. College Savings 
Bank, however, was expressly limited to its facts, id. at *9, 
and did not concern the Equal Protection Clause. It does 
not contradict our decision. Similarly, there is no 
dissonance between our decision in In re Sacred Heart 
Hospital of Norristown, No. 97-1126, 1998 WL 3627 (3d Cir. 
Jan. 8, 1998), and our decision here. In Sacred Heart, we 
did not distinguish between the Bankruptcy Clause and the 
Commerce Clause (both Article I powers) as being 
inappropriate sources of congressional power to abrogate 
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. at *5. Further, 
we found "no evidence suggesting that S 106(a) [of the 
Bankruptcy Code] was enacted pursuant to any 
constitutional provision other than Congress' Bankruptcy 
Clause power." Id. at *6. Here, however, we have found 
such evidence in section 11501's legislative history and 
judicially-recognized anti-discrimination purpose. 
 
In sum, section 11501 is a valid exercise of congressional 
power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
thus effectively abrogating the Commission's Eleventh 
Amendment immunity.9 We now turn to the merits of the 
appeal. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The individual Commissioners also claim that they are immune from 
suit in federal court pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. Wheeling 
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III. The 4-R Act 
 
Wheeling argues that the assessment of construction and 
maintenance costs violates section 11501 because it is an 
illegal tax that discriminates against railroads. 10 The district 
court agreed, concluding that the assessments were"taxes" 
within the meaning of section 11501. Because this issue 
involves the interpretation of federal statutory law, our 
review is plenary. See In re TMI, 89 F.3d 1106, 1112 (3d 
Cir. 1996). Unfortunately, the 4-R Act does not define "tax." 
We must, therefore, begin by determining the appropriate 
rule of construction. 
 
In Department of Revenue of Oregon v. ACF Industries, 
510 U.S. 332, 114 S. Ct. 843 (1994), the Court held that 
nonrailroad property tax exemptions were not prohibited by 
subsection (b)(4). 
 
       "When determining the breadth of a federal statute that 
       impinges upon or pre-empts the States' traditional 
       powers, we are hesitant to extend the statute beyond 
       its evident scope. We will interpret a statute to pre- 
       empt the traditional state powers only if that result is 
       "the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." " 
 
Id. at 345, 114 S. Ct. at 850-51 (citations omitted). 
 
We have decided two cases dealing with the statutory 
interpretation of "taxes" in a similar context. In National 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
contends that the Commissioners are within the second exception noted 
above: state officials can be sued for prospective injunctive and 
declaratory relief from constitutional violations. See Ex parte Young, 209 
U.S. 123, 28 S. Ct. 441 (1908); Balgowan v. New Jersey, 115 F.3d 214, 
217 (3d Cir. 1997); Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 661 F.2d 23, 26 (3d Cir. 
1981); see also Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, ___ U.S. ___, 117 
S. Ct. 2028, 2034 (1997); Seminole, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1132 
(1996). The parties dispute whether the declaratory or injunctive relief 
that Wheeling seeks is truly prospective. Because we have decided that 
the Commission is not immune, we need not reach this issue. 
 
10. "The following acts unreasonably burden and discriminate against 
interstate commerce, and a State, subdivision of a State, or authority 
acting for a State or subdivision of a state may not do any of them: . . . 
Impose another tax that discriminates against a rail carrier . . . ." 49 
U.S.C. S 11501(b)(4). 
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Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility 
Commission, 848 F.2d 436 (3d Cir. 1988) (hereinafter 
Amtrak), the issue was whether "any taxes or other fees" 
covered levies against Amtrak for building and maintaining 
the Cassatt Avenue bridge. Id. at 438 (interpreting 45 
U.S.C. S 546b (recodified at 49 U.S.C. S 24301(l))). That 
decision outlined the declining history of intercity rail 
passenger service in America and Congress's efforts to 
revitalize it. Id. at 438. Congress rationalized Amtrak's 
exemption by theorizing that cities would gladly pay a user 
contribution to maintain rail passenger service. Id. In 
Amtrak, we reasoned, "[w]hether such`special assessments' 
will be construed as `taxes' depends on the context in which 
the terms are raised." Id. Additionally, we instructed that 
"the meaning of the word `tax' is a matter of federal law 
deduced from congressional policy underlying the statute, 
rather than from state tax labels developed in an entirely 
unrelated legal context." Id. at 439. After noting that 
exemptions from taxation usually do not apply to such 
assessments, we adopted some general rules: 
 
       "When a tax exemption is granted to certain private 
       entities, the statutory language is construed closely 
       because it affords a special privilege not available to 
       others. Likewise, when a statute waives the federal 
       government's freedom from local taxation, that 
       language is also narrowly construed because it defeats 
       the immunity shielding the federal government. In 
       interpreting an exemption statute, the intention of the 
       legislative body is pivotal." 
 
Id. Amtrak, we concluded, was not an ordinary private firm; 
Congress intended it to be exempt from state and local 
taxes and fees to the same extent as the federal 
government. Thus, under a liberal reading of that statute, 
the bridge assessment was within the meaning of the 
statutory phrase "taxes or other fees." Id. at 439-40. 
 
Likewise, in Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation 
Authority v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission , 826 F. 
Supp. 1506 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (hereinafter SEPTA ), aff'd 27 
F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 1994) (unpublished table decision), the 
same issue arose under a different statute, which confers 
Amtrak's tax immunity upon certain commuter authorities. 
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See 49 U.S.C. S 24501(g). The district court found that 
Congress intended the phrase "taxes or other fees" in 
section 24501(g) to have the same broad meaning as our 
Amtrak decision found Congress to have given to identical 
language in section 24301(l). Id. at 1525-26. 
 
Amtrak and SEPTA involved the interpretation of statutes 
with different purposes and histories from the statute at 
issue here. Nonetheless, we believe the reasoning 
underlying those cases is instructive regarding the 
principles of statutory construction applicable here. The 
statutes in Amtrak and SEPTA were construed broadly 
because those entities had tax immunity comparable to 
that of the federal government. In contrast, we must 
interpret section 11501 strictly here, because Wheeling is a 
private entity benefitting from a special provision exempting 
it from discriminatory taxation. Thus, we must consider the 
context in which the term "tax" is raised and the 
congressional policy underlying section 11501 to determine 
if it was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress to 
include such assessments within that provision. 
 
As the Commission, Scott Township, and the Department 
of Transportation all point out, there is nothing in the 
legislative history that sheds light on what Congress meant 
by the word "tax" in section 11501(b)(4). See generally 
Alabama Great S. R.R. Co. v. Eagerton, 663 F.2d 1036, 
1041 (11th Cir. 1981). Moreover, they maintain that 
because assessing railroads for such improvements was 
commonplace when the 4-R Act was enacted and Congress 
did not address that practice in either the Act or the 
legislative history, then Congress did not intend "tax" to 
include bridge assessments. This argument parallels the 
Supreme Court's reasoning in ACF regarding ad valorem 
tax exemptions: 
 
       "It was common at the time [S 11501] was drafted, as 
       it is now, for States with generally applicable ad 
       valorem property taxes to exempt various classes of 
       commercial property. . . . Given the prevalence of 
       property tax exemptions when Congress enacted the 
       4-R Act, [S 11501's] silence on the subject--in light of 
       the explicit prohibition of tax rate and [tax] assessment 
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       ratio discrimination--reflects a determination to permit 
       the States to leave their exemptions in place." 
 
ACF, 510 U.S. at 344, 114 S. Ct. at 850. 
 
Another court followed this reasoning in Chicago & North 
Western Transportation Co. v. Webster County, 71 F.3d 265 
(8th Cir. 1995). There, the County Board of Supervisors 
was expanding a drainage ditch running under a railroad's 
right-of-way. The County ordered the railroad to install a 
larger culvert under its tracks. When the railroad refused, 
the County installed the culvert anyway, and assessed the 
cost against the railroad. The Court found that the culvert 
solely benefitted the railroad because it kept the railroad's 
right-of-way intact: the Supervisors could have legally 
bulldozed a wider ditch through the right-of-way, resulting 
in the same benefit to the public. The Court also noted that 
before the passage of the 4-R Act: 
 
       "many states had statutes requiring railroads to 
       construct improvements, including culverts, when 
       drainage ditches crossed their rights-of-way . . . . 
 
        These statutes represent the juridical background 
       against which Congress passed the 4-R Act, and 
       nothing in either its language or its legislative history 
       indicates that Congress wanted to upset or undermine 
       state drainage laws. Congress did not express an intent 
       to preempt the states' longstanding and common 
       practice of charging railroads for certain drainage 
       improvements, and we refuse to impute that intent into 
       S [11501(b)(4)], given the historical environment in 
       which it was enacted." 
 
71 F.3d at 267-68. Here, the statutes giving the 
Commission the powers to order the construction and 
assess the costs of railroad crossing improvements date 
back to 1913. See 66 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. SS 2702, 2704 
(historical notes). Like the ad valorem tax exemptions in 
ACF and the culvert assessment in Chicago & North 
Western, assessing bridge improvement costs in 
Pennsylvania was a longstanding practice when Congress 
enacted the 4-R Act. Thus, we are convinced that the 
congressional policy underlying section 11501 was not to 
treat bridge assessments as taxes. We conclude that it was 
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not the clear and manifest purpose of Congress to include 
bridge assessments within the meaning of the word "tax" in 
section 11501(b)(4). 
 
This conclusion is consistent with our comments in 
Amtrak that such assessments are usually not considered 
within exemptions from taxation. 848 F.2d at 439. There, 
we found support in an early Supreme Court case reaching 
a similar conclusion: 
 
       "The charges here [costs of grading and paving a street] 
       are not taxes proper, are not contributions to the state 
       or to the city for the purpose of enabling either to carry 
       on its general administration of affairs, but are charges 
       only, and specially, for the cost for a local improvement 
       supposed to have resulted in an enhancement of the 
       value of the railroad company's property." 
 
Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Decatur, 147 U.S. 190, 208-209, 13 
S. Ct. 293, 298 (1893) (cited by Amtrak, 848 F.2d at 439). 
Importantly, the amount assessed here does not raise 
revenue for the general fund of either the Township or the 
Commonwealth. (J.A. at 266-68) 
 
Our conclusion is also consistent with the progeny of the 
Head Money Cases (Edye v. Robertson), 112 U.S. 580, 5 S. 
Ct. 247 (1884) (finding that a fifty-cent levy on ship owners 
for every immigrant passenger entering a U.S. port was not 
a tax because the money was used to regulate immigration, 
not for the general support of the government). Following 
that precedent, the Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and 
Ninth Circuits have decided that assessing the costs of a 
new drainage culvert and the costs of railroad regulation, 
respectively, are not taxes within the meaning of 
section 11501. See Chicago & North Western, 71 F.3d at 
265; Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Or., 899 
F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1990). Those Courts reasoned that since 
the government levies at issue did not raise money for the 
general welfare, they were not taxes within the meaning of 
the respective statutes. 
 
Wheeling's counter argument is that the assessment 
must be a tax because it partially relieves the state or 
township fisc of the cost of a bridge benefitting the public. 
This argument is not convincing. The bridge assessment 
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does not contribute to the general fund of either the 
Township or the Commonwealth and is specific to a 
particular bridge at a particular crossing. Moreover, none of 
the levies in Chicago & North Western, Union Pacific, Head 
Money Cases, and Decatur were held to be taxes, even 
though they all arguably relieved burdens on the public 
fisc. 
 
According to Wheeling, Chicago & North Western held 
that assessments are not taxes because the improvement 
benefitted that railroad alone. We disagree, and believe that 
the more logical reading is that to the extent a portion of 
the project benefitted that railroad, the cost of that portion 
should be assessed to that railroad. Here, the Commission 
determined that a new bridge would benefit both the 
railroad and the public and assessed the costs of 
construction and maintenance accordingly. The 
Commission's assessment order adopting the 
Recommended Decision of the Administrative Law Judge 
stated: "Only after the Commission determines a particular 
party has a direct interest in or bears some responsibility 
for or obtains a discernible benefit from a specific crossing, 
does the Commission exercise its authority under state law 
to assess construction and maintenance responsibilities." 
(J.A. at 249, emphasis added.) Here, Wheeling directly 
benefits from the above-grade crossing of the Township's 
right-of-way because its trains are not impeded by any 
cross-traffic. This directly benefits Wheeling's safety and 
efficiency. Although the bridge benefits the general public, 
the peculiar benefit Wheeling receives from the construction 
and maintenance of the bridge reinforces our conclusion 
that the assessment is not a "tax" within the meaning of 
section 11501. 
 
There is no need to overrule either Amtrak or SEPTA, as 
the Commission urges. Bridge assessments were intended 
to be included in the phrase "taxes or other fees" regarding 
the statutes applicable to those two cases, construed 
broadly, but not intended to be included in the word "tax" 
in section 11501, construed strictly. We find that the weight 
of authority supports our conclusion that Congress did not 
manifest a clear intent to include the assessment of bridge 
construction and maintenance costs, like those at issue 
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here, within the meaning of "taxes" in section 11501. 
Without taxes, there was no discriminatory taxation. 
Therefore, the Commission and the Township did not 
violate 49 U.S.C. S 11501. 
 
IV. 
 
In sum, we hold that the district court erred by 
concluding that the assessments were discriminatory taxes, 
and for the reasons set forth above, we will reverse. 
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GARTH, J., dissenting: 
 
I cannot agree with the majority of the panel which has 
reversed the district court's order of October 11, 1996, and 
has held: (1) that we have subject matter jurisdiction to 
decide Wheeling's claim against the Commonwealth; (2) 
that accordingly, we need not reach the issue of the 
Eleventh Amendment immunity of the individual 
Commissioners; and (3) that the assessment of 
construction and maintenance costs made against Wheeling 
is not a tax and does not discriminate against Wheeling in 
violation of 49 U.S.C.A. S 11501 et seq. (West 1997) ("the 
4-R Act"). 
 
Because I believe that the majority has erred in its 
constitutional analysis as well as in the result which it 
reaches, I would affirm the district court's order.1 In doing 
so, I would hold that under the doctrine of Ex Parte Young, 
209 U.S. 123 (1908), all future maintenance costs can be 
enjoined. I leave to the court for future decision, however, 
the question as to whether relief is available for assessed, 
but unpaid, construction costs. 
 
I have come to this conclusion because I find no 
Congressional power under the Fourteenth Amendment to 
abrogate the sovereign immunity of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania. Hence, as to the Commonwealth, we have no 
jurisdiction to entertain Wheeling's challenge. However, as 
pertains to the individual Commissioners, their action in 
assessing Wheeling constitutes -- under my analysis and 
the precedents I cite -- a discriminatory tax. 
 
Thus, I conclude that maintenance costs accruing in the 
future can be enjoined. I leave open for another day the 
question as to whether an unpaid assessment can be 
enjoined without violating the Eleventh Amendment. 
 
I. 
 
As the majority has explained, the Eleventh Amendment 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The issue of whether Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity strips 
subject matter jurisdiction from the federal forum was not before the 
district court. 
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to the United States Constitution confers sovereign 
immunity upon the States. Without its explicit consent, a 
State cannot be sued in federal court unless Congress has 
abrogated its immunity. To abrogate the States' sovereign 
immunity, Congress must (1) unequivocally express its 
intent to abrogate that immunity, and (2) act pursuant to 
a valid exercise of power. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, ___ U.S. 
___, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1123 (1996). At this point, I depart 
from the majority's analysis which upholds jurisdiction over 
the 4-R Act as enforcing the Equal Protection Clause 
because I cannot conclude that Congress could abrogate 
Pennsylvania's sovereign immunity by recourse to the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
I agree with the majority that the 4-R Act was enacted 
pursuant to Congress' commerce powers, and thus, after 
Seminole Tribe, abrogation of the States' sovereign 
immunity can no longer be upheld on that basis. See 
Majority Op. at 6. I further agree that we may venture 
beyond the expressed intent of Congress to determine 
whether the 4-R Act could have been enacted pursuant to 
some other valid exercise of Congressional power such that 
we may still retain jurisdiction over claims against the 
States. See id. at 8. However, I conclude that there is no 
such power granted under the Constitution and hence I 
cannot agree that Congress could have validly enacted the 
4-R Act pursuant to section five, the enforcement provision 
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
 
The 4-R Act explicitly prohibits conduct by State and 
local authorities which "unreasonably burden[s] and 
discriminate[s] against interstate commerce . . . ." 49 
U.S.C.A. S 11501. The purpose of the 4-R Act was to 
"provide the means to rehabilitate and maintain the 
physical facilities, improve the operations and structure, 
and restore the financial stability of the railway system of 
the United States." Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. 
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 481 U.S. 454, 457 (1987). The 
policy behind the 4-R Act, memorialized at 49 U.S.C.A. 
S 10101 (West 1997), describes the commercial and 
economic objectives aimed at unburdening interstate 
commerce by strengthening the rail transport infrastructure 
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of this country through competition and the free market. It 
is only with respect to the realization of these economic 
aims which proscribe predatory pricing, that any mention is 
made of prohibiting discrimination.2 
 
Unlike the majority, I cannot conclude that Congress can 
validly invoke its enforcement powers under sectionfive of 
the Fourteenth Amendment merely because the word 
"discrimination" appears within the statutory text. The 
Congressional enforcement power under section five is not 
unlimited. See City of Boerne v. Flores, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S. 
Ct. 2157, 2163 (1997).3 Enactments legislated pursuant to 
Congress' section five enforcement power must be remedial 
in nature, designed to prevent constitutional infraction. See 
id. 
 
In Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203 (6th Cir. 1996), 
a pre-Flores case, the Sixth Circuit addressed whether acts 
legislated pursuant to Congress' commerce powers can be 
upheld as legitimately enforcing the Equal Protection 
Clause under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment 
after Seminole Tribe. The court concluded that legislation 
enforcing the Equal Protection Clause only extends to that 
"class of persons that Fourteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence has already identified as deserving special 
protection." Id. at 210. In light of Flores, the Sixth Circuit's 
holding in Wilson-Jones properly recognized that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Section 10101 states, in pertinent part: 
 
       In regulating the railroad industry, it is the policy of the United 
       States Government-- 
 
       (12) to prohibit predatory pricing and practices, to avoid undue 
       concentrations of market power, and to prohibit unlawful 
       discrimination. 
 
49 U.S.C.A. S 10101(12) (emphasis added). 
 
3. In Flores, the Supreme Court held that the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act ("RFRA") was unconstitutional because its enactment 
exceeded Congress' enforcement power under sectionfive of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Instead of remedying or preventing 
constitutional infringements, the Court concluded that RFRA altered the 
meaning the Free Exercise Clause, thereby exceeding Congress' 
legitimate exercise of its section five power. 
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enactments construed as enforcing the Equal Protection 
clause must remedy or prevent constitutional infringements. 
 
Similarly, in CSX Transportation v. Board of Public Works, 
___ F.3d ___, No. 97-1296, 1998 WL 100394 (4th Cir. Mar. 
10, 1998), a post-Flores opinion, the Fourth Circuit 
indicated that the district court held -- as I would -- that 
the 4-R Act could not be enacted under the sectionfive 
power of the Fourteenth Amendment, as "the major 
purpose of the 4-R Act in general [is] to protect interstate 
commerce." Id. at 2.4 Accordingly, the district court 
dismissed a challenge by two railroads for the assessment 
of illegally assessed taxes under the 4-R Act for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction in light of Seminole Tribe.5 
 
By enacting the 4-R Act, Congress was not legislating to 
prevent unconstitutional behavior. There is no evidence 
that the discriminatory taxation which Congress intended 
to prohibit under the 4-R Act ever rose to the level of a 
constitutional violation such that the railroads were 
deprived of their right to equal protection. See, e.g., 
Nashville Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Browning, 310 
U.S. 362 (1940) (holding that higher tax burden placed 
upon railroad property did not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause). Without such evidence, we have no basis to 
conclude that Congress had the power to enact the 4-R Act 
pursuant to its enforcement power under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2169. 
 
Thus, although the court in Wilson-Jones opined in a 
footnote that its conclusion might differ had "Congress 
made findings that a particular group needed legal 
protection to remedy some sort of invidious discrimination 
not addressed by federal precedent," 99 F.3d at 210 n.4, 
Congress has not made such findings in this case. Hence, 
the majority's rejection of Wilson-Jones despite its reliance 
upon this footnote is ill-founded as a justification to uphold 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. I have been unable to directly access the district court opinion, as it 
is unavailable on either Westlaw or Lexis. 
 
5. The Fourth Circuit reversed, however, on the basis that the district 
court had jurisdiction over State officials under the doctrine of Ex Parte 
Young. I discuss the Fourth Circuit's opinion in CSX Transportation infra 
at 10 n.9, 18. 
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jurisdiction over the 4-R Act. See Majority Op. at 9. 
Nowhere in the 4-R Act can a Congressional expression be 
found that the 4-R Act was passed "to secure the rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment." Katzenbach v. Morgan, 
384 U.S. 641, 652 (1966). 
 
In fact, the majority implicitly concedes this point by 
reference to the following passage from Alabama Great 
Southern Railroad Company v. Eagerton, 663 F.2d 1036 
(11th Cir. 1981): 
 
       Until this law was passed . . . states could 
       constitutionally classify railroads differently from all 
       other taxpayers for the impositions of state taxes 
       without violating the equal protection clause[sic] of the 
       Fourteenth Amendment. It was the obvious purpose of 
       Congress to put an end to this practice, where such 
       treatment of the railroads as a class was 
       discriminatory in effect. 
 
Id. at 1040 (emphasis added); see Majority Op. at 8. Thus, 
the majority acknowledges that prior to the passage of the 
4-R Act disparate classifications concerning railroads for 
taxation purposes were constitutional and did not violate the 
Equal Protection Clause. Indeed, this was well-settled law. 
See Browning, 310 U.S. at 369 ("so far as the Federal 
Constitution is concerned, a state can put railroad property 
into one pigeonhole and other property into another . . ."). 
Nevertheless, the majority now apparently characterizes 
such classifications as unconstitutional, sufficient to 
warrant congressional enactment of the 4-R Act under the 
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. From 
Flores, we learn that "Congress does not enforce a 
constitutional right by changing what the right is." 117 S. 
Ct. at 2164. Congress cannot make constitutional 
classifications unconstitutional, even though it can make 
such classifications unlawful. That is precisely what the 
4-R Act did: it prohibited long-standing constitutionally 
permissible discriminatory taxation practices. It did not -- 
indeed, could not -- make such discrimination 
unconstitutional. 
 
Furthermore, the majority's analysis regarding the 
"findings" that Congress made that could support the 
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enactment of the instant legislation under the section five 
power is both flawed and untenable. The legislative history 
and judicial recognition referencing discrimination cannot 
transform what was admittedly a constitutionally 
permissible classification into an impermissible one. That 
railroads were "easy prey" which were subjected to higher 
rates of taxation than other taxable entities does not lead to 
the inescapable conclusion that the discrimination that the 
railroads suffered -- the disparate classification for taxation 
purposes -- rose to unconstitutional proportions. The 
majority has not pointed to any evidence that could support 
the conclusion that the disparate taxation to which 
railroads were subjected constituted a violation under the 
Equal Protection Clause, and as I have mentioned above, 
Congress made no explicit findings, as Flores instructs 
must be done. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2169. The mere fact 
that the railroads were permissibly discriminated against 
for taxation purposes is insufficient. Disparate tax 
classifications concerning railroads were long-standing: 
 
       That the states may classify property for taxation; may 
       set up different modes of assessment, valuation and 
       collection; may tax some kinds of property at higher 
       rates than others; and in making all these 
       differentiations may treat railroads and other utilities 
       with that separateness which their distinctive 
       characteristics and functions in society make 
       appropriate -- these are among the commonplaces of 
       taxation and of constitutional law. 
 
Browning, 310 U.S. at 368. 
 
As no constitutional infraction has been shown, there is 
no issue to address concerning whether the sectionfive 
enforcement power can be employed to abrogate the States' 
sovereign immunity. More importantly, as there is no 
constitutional violation to remedy, interpreting S 11501 as 
the majority has is out of proportion to its remedial 
objective. "There must be a congruence and proportionality 
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the 
means adopted to that end. Lacking such a connection, 
legislation may become substantive in operation and effect." 
Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2164. Quite simply, there can be no 
congruence between the injury sought to be prevented in 
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this case and the sustaining of S 11501 under the 
Fourteenth Amendment section five enforcement power, 
because the injury involved in this case is simply not a 
constitutional injury. 
 
Accordingly, after Seminole Tribe, and in the absence of 
any other legitimate constitutional grant of power, the 
Congressional intent to abrogate the States' sovereign 
immunity under the 4-R Act cannot be upheld as enacted 
pursuant to a valid exercise of power.6  See also Mills v. 
State of Maine, 118 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 1997) (rejecting 
section five of the Fourteenth Amendment as a means to 
retain federal jurisdiction over FLSA claim against the State 
in post-Seminole Tribe context). 
 
In addition to Flores, other recent holdings from our 
court also support my position that the 4-R Act cannot be 
upheld as a valid enactment pursuant to the section five 
enforcement power. See In re: Sacred Heart Hosp., 133 F.3d 
237 (3d Cir. 1998);7 College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid 
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 131 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 
1997).8 While I acknowledge that these cases do not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. This, of course, does not mean that the statute, itself, is 
unconstitutional. Rather, it simply means that federal courts are without 
jurisdiction to adjudicate such claims against the States because the 
Eleventh Amendment proscribes them. 
 
7. In Sacred Heart, we addressed the constitutionality of S 106(a) of the 
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. S 106(a), which purports to abrogate state 
sovereign immunity in bankruptcy proceedings, in a post-Seminole Tribe 
context. As the Bankruptcy Clause is an Article I power, see U.S. Const. 
art. I, S 8, cl. 4, we held that it could not sustain an enactment 
abrogating a state's sovereign immunity after Seminole Tribe. In 
considering whether S 106(a) could have been properly enacted pursuant 
to section five of the Fourteenth Amendment, we held that there was no 
evidence to support such a construction. Accordingly, we concluded that 
S 106(a) was unconstitutional as it was not enacted pursuant to a 
legitimate exercise of Congressional power. 
 
8. In College Savings Bank, we considered whether the district court 
properly dismissed a claim against the State of Florida brought under 
the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act of 1992 ("TRCA") for want of 
subject matter jurisdiction after Seminole Tribe. In affirming, we held 
that on the facts of that case jurisdiction could not be upheld pursuant 
to the section five power as a means to enforce the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment as no protected property right was at 
issue. 
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concern railroads or the 4-R Act, they form the crux of the 
analysis which must obtain where an act legislated 
pursuant to some other congressional power, such as the 
commerce clause, is examined for whether it can be upheld 
as a valid enactment under the section five power. 
 
The majority finds no incompatibility between its holding 
and the holdings of the aforementioned cases largely 
because of the different subject matters involved and 
"section 11501's legislative history and judicially recognized 
anti-discrimination purpose." Majority Op. at 10. In each of 
those cases, however, and contrary to the conclusion which 
the majority reaches, the respective courts held that such 
legislation could not be validly enacted pursuant to the 
section five power. Furthermore, as I have indicated above, 
the discrimination referenced in S 11501's legislative history 
and by various courts does not, by itself, render the 
discrimination the 4-R Act intends to prevent 
unconstitutional discrimination subject to enforcement 
under the section five power of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The majority's view of the test for validity under section five 
of the Fourteenth Amendment is so permissive, "it is 
difficult to conceive of a principle that would limit 
congressional power." Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2168. 
 
Thus, I cannot join the majority of this panel in holding 
that this court retains subject matter jurisdiction over 
Wheeling's 4-R Act claims against the Commission. 
Notwithstanding that conclusion, Wheeling's claim for 
prospective declaratory and injunctive relief still survives 
against the individual Commissioners under the doctrine of 
Ex Parte Young -- a subject not addressed by the majority. 
See CSX Transp., Inc. v. Board of Public Works, ___ F.3d 
___, No. 97-1296, 1998 WL 100394 (4th Cir. Mar. 10, 1998);9 
Majority Op. at 7 n.7. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Like the case before us, CSX Transportation v. Board of Public Works, 
___ F.3d ___, No. 97-1296, 1998 WL 100394 (4th Cir. Mar. 10, 1998), 
involved a challenge by two railroads to a tax levied in violation of the 
4-R Act. The district court dismissed the case for want of subject matter 
jurisdiction in light of Seminole Tribe, see supra at 4-5, but found no 
basis for jurisdiction over state officials under Ex Parte Young. While 
not 
addressing whether the 4-R Act could be properly enacted pursuant to 
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II. 
 
A. 
 
The district court held that the assessment levied against 
Wheeling for three (3) percent of the construction costs and 
for fifteen (15) percent of the future maintenance costs of 
the bridge constituted not only a tax under 49 S 11501(b)(4),10 
but a discriminatory tax. I discuss the discriminatory 
character of the tax in Section II(B), infra.  
 
A tax "raises money, contribute[s] to a general fund, and 
[is] spent for the benefit of the entire community." San Juan 
Cellular Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 967 F.2d 683, 685 
(1st Cir. 1992). By contrast, a fee is imposed for regulatory 
purposes generally by an entity upon those who are subject 
to its regulation. When it is unclear whether an assessment 
is a tax or a fee, courts 
 
       emphasize the revenue's ultimate use, asking whether 
       it provides a general benefit to the public, of a sort 
       often financed by a general tax, or whether it provides 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
the section five power of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fourth Circuit 
reversed, holding that the members of the Board of Public Works could 
be enjoined from the collection of such illegal taxes under the doctrine 
of Ex Parte Young. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit resolved the issue of 
improperly assessed taxes not yet paid -- an issue which I have pointed 
out but have left open for this court to decide at a later time. See infra 
at 18. Hence, the analysis of the Fourth Circuit adopted in CSX 
Transportation coincides with my own in this case. 
 
10. Section 11501(b)(4) states: 
 
       (b) The following acts unreasonably burden and discriminate 
       against interstate commerce, and a State, subdivision of a State, 
or 
       authority acting for a State or subdivision of a State may not do 
any 
       of them: 
 
       . . . 
 
        (4) Impose another tax that discriminates against a rail carrier 
       providing transportation subject to the jurisdiction of the Board 
under 
       this part. 
 
49 U.S.C.A. S 11501(b)(4) (West 1997). 
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       more narrow benefits to regulated companies or defrays 
       the agency's costs of regulation. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). Support for this distinction between 
taxes and regulatory fees is found in the Head Money 
Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1984), and Union Pacific Railroad 
Company v. Public Utilities Commission, 899 F.2d 854 (9th 
Cir. 1990), another case brought under the 4-R Act. 
 
In those cases, the courts reasoned that the assessments 
in question were used to finance the cost of the regulatory 
programs regulating the immigration and railroad 
industries, respectively. Therefore, the benefits from these 
regulatory programs did not inure to the public-at-large but 
only to the regulated industries. Accordingly, they did not 
constitute taxes. 
 
Thus, the majority's reliance upon these cases as 
authority which would authorize the assessments made in 
the instant case is misplaced. Those cases do no more than 
hold that monies used for the benefit of the particular 
industry do not necessarily benefit the public in general, 
and thus cannot be deemed "taxes." 
 
Here, considering the ultimate use of the monies 
assessed by the Commission, I can only conclude-- as did 
the district court -- that the assessments in question are a 
tax which benefits the general public which uses the 
bridge. Unlike a regulatory fee which would provide specific 
benefits to Wheeling, the revenue from the instant 
assessments was earmarked for a highway bridge that, 
once repaired, would provide a general benefit to the public 
at large. 
 
It must be kept in mind that Wheeling's tracks are not 
laid upon the bridge in question. Rather, Wheeling's tracks 
run under the very bridge for which Wheeling has been 
assessed and for which it is required to pay future 
maintenance charges. Wheeling has been running its trains 
under the bridge throughout the duration of the period that 
the bridge has been closed. 
 
In its amendment to the complaint before the 
Commission, Scott Township conceded that the 
construction and repair of the highway bridge was for the 
 
                                27 
  
benefit of the general public, not the railroads. Scott 
Township alleged: 
 
       (4)(d) That the present design of the "Crooked Bridge" 
       is dangerous and not conducive to meeting the needs 
       of the Township and travelling [sic] public in the area. 
 
       . . . 
 
       (5)(e) That the bridge above [Wheeling] be replaced 
       with one designed to meet the needs of the Township 
       and travelling [sic] public. 
 
Amend. to Compl. at 2-3 (emphasis added). These 
averments -- made by Scott Township -- are revealing. 
They disclose that the Township intended to repair the 
bridge (which as the record establishes, provides no benefit 
for Wheeling) not for the benefit of Wheeling but only for 
that of the general public. 
 
The testimony of Patricia Wodnicki, the former manager/ 
secretary of Scott Township, supports this fact as well. At 
her deposition, Wodnicki testified that the bridge for which 
the assessment was imposed upon Wheeling had been 
closed by 1982. See Dep. Patricia Wodnicki at 7 (Dec. 11, 
1995).11 Notwithstanding that the bridge had been closed by 
1982, there is no contention that interference had been had 
with Wheeling's railroad operations or that Wheeling's 
operations had been interrupted or impacted upon as a 
result of the bridge's condition. In fact, the Commission's 
Administrative Law Judge found that: 
 
       If the highway is permanently closed and the bridge 
       demolished, [Wheeling's] operations will not be affected. 
       The proposed improvement will not result in any 
       changes to [Wheeling's] operations nor will it provide 
       [Wheeling] with any additional revenues. 
 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (May 27, 1994). 
Furthermore, the repair of the bridge does not implicate 
any regulatory program regulating Wheeling's activities. 
Accordingly, because the assessment and maintenance 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. The Amendment to Complaint and excerpts from the deposition of 
Patricia Wodnicki were submitted to the court by a letter dated 
September 12, 1997, after oral argument, upon the request of the court. 
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charges benefit only the general public and not specifically 
Wheeling, I conclude that the assessment levied upon 
Wheeling constituted a tax. 
 
I believe the majority's reasoning which relies upon 
National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Pennsylvania 
Public Utility Commission, 848 F.2d 436 (3d Cir. 
1988)("Amtrak"), and Septa v. Pennsylvania Public Utility 
Commission, 826 F. Supp. 1506 (E.D. Pa. 1993) ("Septa"), 
aff 'd 27 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 1994) (unpublished table 
decision), to identify when an assessment is a tax, is flawed.12 
Those cases arise in a context different from the context of 
this appeal. Both cases involve a Congressional statute 
which exempted the railroad from any "taxes or other fees" 
imposed by any state. No definition of "taxes" or "fees" was 
furnished in either court's holding that a special 
assessment to pay for the construction and maintenance of 
identified bridges could not be charged against the 
railroads. Thus, their analyses cannot assist us in 
distinguishing between a tax which should be borne by the 
general public and a regulatory fee properly imposed upon 
a carrier, because the statutory framework of those two 
cases exempted the railroad from both taxes and fees. I 
therefore read these cases and their discussions and 
holdings to be inapposite. 
 
B. 
 
Because the majority has held that Scott Township's 
assessment does not constitute a tax, it has not addressed 
the issue of whether the tax is discriminatory. To determine 
whether this tax discriminates against Wheeling under 
S 11501, we must compare the effect of the tax upon a 
certain "comparison class" of other taxpayers. 
 
Our sister courts in Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Significantly, two cases on which the majority relies and which I find 
inapposite held that under a Congressional exemption statute, railroads 
could not be assessed construction and maintenance costs. See National 
R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 848 F.2d 436 
(3d Cir. 1988); Septa v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 826 F. Supp. 
1506 (E.D. Pa. 1993). 
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Company v. Arizona, 78 F.3d 438 (9th Cir 1996), and 
Kansas City Railway Company v. McNamara, 817 F.2d 368 
(8th Cir. 1987), have held that the comparison class to 
which a railroad such as Wheeling should be compared is 
that of "other commercial and industrial taxpayers." 78 
F.3d at 441; 817 F.2d at 375. The Commission argues that 
because it has only limited jurisdiction to assess costs to a 
small group of entities that it would be inappropriate to 
compare its assessment on Wheeling to a class of all 
commercial and industrial taxpayers. Although we have yet 
to decide this issue, and as I have pointed out, the majority 
has not addressed it, I believe that the approach adopted by 
our sister courts in Atchison and Kansas City provides a 
logical and sensible rule of law. 
 
If the comparison class were only those entities which 
were also taxed by the Commission, there would seldom, if 
ever, be any finding of discriminatory taxation. In Kansas 
City the court explained that 
 
       [t]he only simple way to prevent tax discrimination 
       against the railroads is to tie their tax fate to the fate 
       of a large and local group of taxpayers. A large group 
       of local taxpayers will have the political and economic 
       power to protect itself against an unfair distribution of 
       the tax burden. 
 
817 F.2d at 375. 
 
Given that I would adopt as the comparison class the 
group of commercial and industrial taxpayers, I must 
conclude that the tax at issue against Wheeling is a 
discriminatory tax. None of the parties disputes that 
industrial and commercial taxpayers were not subjected to 
the tax assessment for the repair and reconstruction of the 
highway bridge. As a result, I would affirm the district 
court's ruling of discrimination as well. 
 
III. 
 
Wheeling seeks both declaratory and injunctive relief. As 
I would hold that after the Supreme Court decided Seminole 
Tribe, this court no longer has subject matter jurisdiction 
over the 4-R Act to hear cases involving the Commission, I 
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am obliged to address the issue of whether the individual 
Commissioners may be sued under the doctrine of Ex Parte 
Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). As I have noted, the majority 
has not dealt with this issue. See supra at 8-9. 
 
The doctrine of Ex Parte Young permits suits against 
state officials acting in their official capacity -- 
notwithstanding the States' immunity under the Eleventh 
Amendment -- if the suit seeks prospective declaratory 
and/or injunctive relief. It does not allow suits for 
retrospective relief. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 
(1974). 
 
Wheeling has not yet paid the discriminatory taxes it was 
assessed regarding the construction of the bridge. Wheeling 
thus contends that it is seeking prospective relief because 
the assessment would have to be paid in the future. In 
addition, Wheeling asserts that because the future 
maintenance costs have not yet been assessed, the relief it 
requests is prospective in nature. By contrast, the 
Commissioners claim that the Commission's order 
assessing costs to Wheeling became final when Wheeling 
appealed the Commission's order. The Commissioners 
argue that if this court were to grant Wheeling relief, we 
would have to hold the Commission's order -- a past act -- 
invalid, and that such would be contrary to Eleventh 
Amendment doctrine. 
 
The issue of prospectivity is a difficult one. I have no 
problem holding that Wheeling is entitled to the prospective 
declaratory and injunctive relief concerning the future 
maintenance costs. Although the tax liability has already 
been determined, the Commissioners have not yet assessed 
those taxes. Accordingly, this court would merely be 
enjoining the state actors from assessing future taxes, and 
that would fall comfortably within the Ex Parte Young 
doctrine. 
 
With respect to the taxes assessed against Wheeling for 
the construction of the bridge, however, the prospectivity 
issue is less clear, and I am troubled by the Commission's 
claim that there is no remedy or relief available to Wheeling 
for the construction assessment made against it, despite 
Wheeling's consistent and continual challenge to that 
assessment as a discriminatory tax. 
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Since we have heard oral argument, the Fourth Circuit 
has directly addressed this issue in CSX Transportation, Inc. 
v. Board of Public Works, ___ F.3d ___, No. 97-1296, 1998 
WL 100394 (4th Cir. Mar. 10, 1998). Upholding jurisdiction 
over state officials under the Ex Parte Young doctrine, the 
Fourth Circuit held that "[a]n injunction against the future 
collection of the illegal taxes, even those that already have 
been assessed, is prospective, and therefore available under 
the Ex parte Young [sic] doctrine." Id. at 3 (emphasis 
added). "The point is that the future collection[of the taxes] 
is illegal." Id. at 6. Thus, under CSX Transportation, it is 
within the power of the court to enjoin as prospective relief 
improperly assessed -- though not yet paid -- taxes. 
 
As I am in dissent and my opinion on the issue of 
prospectivity is without precedential authority, I leave the 
resolution of this issue for another day. Nevertheless, I 
would be inclined to hold that Eleventh Amendment 
doctrine would permit relief where a mere assessment 
without payment of the charge has occurred -- as it has 
here -- and the Fourth Circuit has led the way by holding 
so in CSX Transportation. 
 
IV. 
 
In sum, I disagree with the majority's opinion in its 
entirety. 
 
I would hold that this court is without subject matter 
jurisdiction to hear suits against the Commission after 
Seminole Tribe. Nonetheless, Wheeling would be entitled to 
prospective declaratory and injunctive relief under the 
doctrine of Ex Parte Young. 
 
I would also hold that the assessment against Wheeling 
is a tax because it is for the general benefit of the public, 
and not for the narrow benefit of the railroad or to achieve 
some regulatory purpose. 
 
I would further hold that the tax is discriminatory 
because the comparison class of commercial and industrial 
taxpayers was not assessed the tax for construction or 
future maintenance costs. 
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Finally, I would hold that Wheeling is entitled to 
prospective declaratory and injunctive relief from any 
assessment relating to the future maintenance costs of the 
bridge, although as I have indicated above, I do not decide 
at this time whether relief from the Commission's order 
levying the cost of construction of the bridge to Wheeling 
constitutes prospective or retrospective relief. 
 
I therefore respectfully dissent from the majority's 
holdings. 
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